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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement,

Father William Thomas Faucher pled

guilty to two counts of possessing sexually exploitative images, two counts of distribution of
sexually exploitative images, and one count of possession of a controlled substance. He received
an aggregate sentence of twenty-five years fixed. On appeal, Mr. Faucher contends that this
sentence represents an abuse of the district court's discretion, as it is excessive given any view of
the facts and such a sentence for an elderly, infirm defendant violates his Eighth Amendment
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
After his forced retirement as a Catholic priest,

Father Faucher

became extremely depressed, experiencing isolation from his family and lacking the social
interactions attendant with his vibrant career. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter,
PSI),1 pp.2, 217.) He began drinking heavily (one half to one pint of scotch per day), stopped
performing basic hygiene such as brushing his teeth, stopped opening his mail, ate sporadically
and poorly, and "engaged in some very bizarre communication regarding deviant forms of sexual
behavior on the Internet with several adult participants." (PSI, pp.35, 217.) On January 17,
2018, law enforcement received a tip from the National Center for Missing and Exploited
Children. (PSI, pp.I, 391-399.) The report indicated that two sexually explicit images depicting
children were sent from an IP address identified with Mr. Faucher. (PSI, pp.397-400.) The
images were sent together, early in the morning, to an email address belonging to a person

1

Mr. Faucher had only recently started communicating with. (PSI, pp.341-42, 318.) A search
(PSI, p.517.) Thousands of sexually explicit

warrant was issued for Mr. Faucher's home.

images involving children were located on Mr. Faucher's electronic devices. (PSI, p.4; 12/20/18
Tr., p.26, Ls.9-17.) Mr. Faucher also told the officers of a small amount of LSD and small
amounts of marijuana and ecstasy in his home. (PSI, pp.4, 518, 530.)
Law enforcement found Mr. Faucher very cooperative. (12/20/18 Tr., p.64, L.11 - p.69,
L.2; PSI, pp.517-18.) He spoke to them for over three hours-until he began nodding off from
exhaustion. (PSI, pp.8, 518.) During the lengthy interview at his home, he told the detectives
that he obtained the images of child pornography from an individual in Brazil. (PSI, pp.4, 318.)
He did not recall sending the two images depicting child pornography to Tony B., an individual
he was trying to befriend online, but admitted that if their technology indicated that the images
were sent from his computer, he must have been the one to send them. 2

(PSI, pp.341-42, 397-

400, 318-19, 321.) Mr. Faucher explained that he had turned to the internet due to loneliness,
and his online friend in Brazil, Bruno, had sent him thousands of images depicting child
pornography. (PSI, pp.4, 8, 318.)
Based on these facts, Mr. Faucher was charged by information with nineteen counts of
possessing sexually exploitative materials, two counts of distributing sexually exploitative
materials, one count of felony possession of a controlled substance, and two counts of
misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance.

(R., pp.65-72.)

Pursuant to a plea

agreement, Mr. Faucher pled guilty to two counts of possessing sexually exploitative materials,

1

Appellant's use of the designation "PSI" includes the packet of documents grouped with the
electronic copy of the PSI, and the page numbers cited shall refer to the corresponding page of
the electronic file.
2

two counts of distributing sexually exploitative materials, and one count of felony possession of
a controlled substance. (9/28/18 Tr., p.5, L.10 - p.7, L.14; p.18, Ls.9-11; p.20, Ls.2-5; p.21,
L.25 - p.22, L.3; R., pp.186-199.) In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts
and to recommend an aggregate unified sentence of thirty years, with twenty years fixed.
(9/28/18 Tr., p.5, L.16 - p.6, L.8; R., p.194.) The district court accepted the pleas, set the matter
for sentencing, and ordered a presentence investigation and a psychosexual evaluation. (9/28/18
Tr., p.22, L.4 - p.24, L.23; R., pp.200-205.)
At the sentencing hearing, the State called one of the detectives tasked with reviewing the
1,000+ pages of Skype conversations Mr. Faucher had been having with the individual in Brazil
who sent him the images. (12/20/18 Tr., p.11, L.5 - p.21, L.12.) The detective testified as to
some of the more provocative things said betwixt Mr. Faucher and Bruno. (12/20/18 Tr., p.23,
L.9 - p.25, L.27; p.36, L.18 - p.45, L.5.)

Although Mr. Faucher was being convicted of

possessing images, at sentencing, the prosecutor focused her presentation on the substance of
these conversations. (12/20/18 Tr., p.23, L.9 - p.25, L.27; p.36, L.18 - p.45, L.5; p.81, L.9 p.82, L.8.) She asked the district court to sentence Mr. Faucher to thirty years, with twenty years
fixed. (12/20/18 Tr., p.94, Ls.1-4.) Mr. Faucher's counsel asked the district court to withhold
judgment and sentence Mr. Faucher to probation for a period of time, or, if the court did not
withhold judgment, to ten years, with two years fixed, suspended for ten years.

(12/20/18

Tr., p.114, Ls.17-24; p.115, Ls.1-12.) Mr. Faucher was sentenced to twenty-five years fixed, for
two counts of distributing sexually exploitative images, ten fixed years for two counts of
possessing sexually exploitative material, and one fixed year for possessing a controlled

2

Mr. Faucher had great difficulty remembering what had occurred from 2017 until the time he
was arrested in 2018. (PSI, pp.11, 35.) He repeatedly said he was trying to reconstruct the
chronological timeline, and that he had experienced blackouts. (PSI, pp. I 1, 35.)
3

substance. (12/20/18 Tr., p.151, L.18 - p.152, L.3; R., pp.215-219.) All of the sentences were
ordered to be served concurrently.

(12/20/18 Tr., p.151, L.18 - p.152, L.3; R., p.216.)

Mr. Faucher filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.222-225,
228-232.)

4

ISSUES
I.

Did Mr. Faucher's sentence constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of his
rights under the Eighth Amendment and Idaho Constitution?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed an aggregate sentence of
twenty-five years fixed, upon Mr. Faucher following his plea of guilty to two counts of
possessing sexually exploitative material, two counts of distributing sexually exploitative
material, and one count of felony possession of a controlled substance?

5

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court's Imposition Of A Fixed Twenty-Five Year Sentence Violates The
Prohibitions Of The Eighth Amendment To The United States Constitution, And Article I,
Section Six Of The Idaho Constitution, Prohibiting Cruel And Unusual Punishment

A.

Introduction
The district court's imposition of a sentence of twenty-five years fixed, upon Mr. Faucher

for two counts of disseminating explicit images of minors, arising out of the same conduct during
the same time frame, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of both the state and
federal constitutions.

B.

The District Court's Imposition Of A Fixed Twenty-Five Year Sentence Violates The
Prohibitions Of The Eighth Amendment To The United States Constitution, And Article
I, Section Six Of The Idaho Constitution, Prohibiting Cruel And Unusual Punishment
Both the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section VI of

the Idaho Constitution provide that, "[ e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. AMEND. VIII; IDAHO
CONST. ART. I,§ 6. When a claim is made that a sentence violates the federal prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment, the appellate courts "first must make a threshold comparison of
the crime committed and the sentence imposed to determine whether the sentence leads to an
inference of gross disproportionality. State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 394 (1992); Harmelin v.

Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), modifying Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). The gross
disproportionality test comports with the standard applied to cruel and unusual sentencing
challenges under Article I, § 6 of the Idaho Constitution. State v. Evans, 73 Idaho 50, 58
(1952) (citations omitted) ("imprisonment for such a length of time as to be out of all proportion

6

to the gravity of the offense committed, and such as to shock the conscience of reasonable men,
is cruel and unusual within the meaning of the constitution).
In State v. Brown, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized the proportionality test under the
Eighth Amendment. State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 394 (1992). The Brown Court stated:
We limit our proportionality analysis to death penalty cases and, under the Idaho
Constitution as contemplated in State v. Evans, to those cases which are "out of
proportion to the gravity of the offense committed" in the cruel and unusual
punishment setting similar to the "grossly disproportionate" analysis of the eighth
amendment urged by Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter in Harmelin. The
lack of objective standards for evaluating differing terms of imprisonment, see
Harmelin, 111 S.Ct. at 2704-05, gives proportionality review outside these two
limited areas the potential of essentially allowing, if not requiring, this Court to
second guess the trial court's discretionary determination of the criminal sentence
that best fits the criminal defendant and the crime within the reasonable limits of
the sentencing options.
Brown, 121 Idaho at 394.

The proportionality analysis is limited to those cases which are out of proportion to the
gravity of the offense committed. State v. Grazian, 144 Idaho 510, 517 (2007). The reviewing
court compares the crime committed and the sentence imposed to determine whether the
sentence is grossly disproportionate-"whether the punishment is so out of proportion to the
gravity of the offense to shock the conscience of reasonable people." Id. "An intra-and interjurisdictional analysis is appropriate only in the rare case where the sentence is grossly
disproportionate to the crime committed." Id.; State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 485 (2012).
If the Court concludes there is an inference of disproportionality, the Court then
compares the defendant's sentence with sentences imposed on other defendants for the same
offenses. State v. Olivera, 131 Idaho 628, 632 (1998). As with sentence reviews, the Courts
treat the fixed portion of the sentence as the likely term of confinement. Id. at 631, 632 (citations
omitted). Challenges to the length of a sentence on cruel and unusual punishment grounds can

7

be presented on direct appeal, and there is no legitimate reason to treat them differently from
claims of excessiveness under issue preservation requirements. Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433,
438-39 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding that a challenge to the length of a sentence on cruel and unusual
punishment grounds could be raised for the first time on direct appeal); see also State v. Jensen,
138 Idaho 941, 945-46 (Ct. App. 2003).
Mr. Faucher asserts that his sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate to the offense
given his advanced age and his mental and physical disabilities.

The Eighth Amendment

contains a narrow proportionality principle that "does not require strict proportionality between
crime and sentence" but does forbid "extreme sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to the
crime." Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment). Embodied in the Constitution's ban on cruel and unusual punishments
is the "precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the]
offense." Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910). If the mitigating qualities of
advanced age, physical and mental disabilities had been considered, Mr. Faucher would not be
serving a fixed twenty-five year sentence. His sentence is grossly disproportionate to the offense
in light of the information before the court as to his advanced age and physical and mental
impairments. It violates the Eighth Amendment.
In Mr. Faucher's case, his sentence of twenty-five fixed years is out of proportion to the
gravity of the offense committed.
Mr. Faucher retired in June of 2015, after disagreements with several church bishops.
(PSI, pp.25-26.)

Upon his retirement, Mr. Faucher dwelt upon his dislike of three church

bishops and lost his reverence for bishops, generally.

(PSI, p.26.)

After seventy years of

devotion, his faith in the Catholic Church began to waver, and he slipped further into depression.

8

(PSI, p.26.) He finished his most recent novel, but it received only a lukewarm reception from
his family. (PSI, pp.26-27.) He traveled to visit his family and told them that he really needed
them in his life, but they never initiated communication with him. (PSI, p.28.) Mr. Faucher
became even more depressed after unsuccessfully trying to integrate himself first into his family,
and then the church. (PSI, pp.28-29.) At that point in his life, Mr. Faucher sought to reject his
belief in church authority and morality and began looking at adult porn sites and Satanic biogs
online. (PSI, p.30.)
In the fall of 2017, Mr. Faucher was experiencing intense loneliness and depression and
was drinking alcohol to excess as a result of these feelings.

(PSI, pp.6-7, 217-18; 12/20/18

Tr., p.120, L.21 - p.121, L.25.) He was eating poorly at this time, and he was later diagnosed
with alcohol-induced dementia. (PSI, pp.6-7, 172, 185, 195, 198-99, 217-18.) While drunk, he
began electronically communicating with a man in Brazil from whom he received explicit
images of child pornography. 3 (PSI, pp.442-43, 448; 12/20/18 Tr., p.31, L.24 - p.34, L.24.)
Late one evening in January of 2019, Mr. Faucher, still deep in dementia, sent two of these
images to the email address of a person with whom he had just begun to converse. (PSI, pp.34142.) As a result of these acts-receiving and sending two images, Mr. Faucher will certainly die
in prison. Despite never having received even so much as a traffic ticket, this well-respected,
retired Catholic priest will spend the rest of his life (which will certainly not exceed 25 years) in
prison. Such a sentence leads to an inference of gross disproportionality where it is a non-

3

Apparently Mr. Faucher permitted his
Brazilian friend to create a
Dropbox account on Mr. Faucher's computer, and in August of 2017, the friend began dropping
hundreds of images of child pornography into the Dropbox account he had set up for
Mr. Faucher. (PSI, pp.442-43, 448; 12/20/18 Tr., p.31, L.24- p.34, L.24.) Mr. Faucher deleted
most of the files and subfolders. (PSI, p.449; 12/20/18 Tr., p.69, L.3 - p.70, L.4.)
9

violent, internet-based offense, and he was a first-time offender of advanced age with mental
illness and physical infirmities.
Mr. Faucher contends his sentence is cruel and unusual.

His sentence is grossly

disproportionate given the nature of non-violent, internet-based offenses, combined with his
advanced age, mental health issues, and infirmities, are in violation of the Eighth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and of Idaho's state constitutional prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment.

1.

Mr. Faucher's Sentence Violates The Eighth Amendment And Article I Section 6
Of The Idaho Constitution Prohibiting Cruel And Unusual Punishment Because It
Is Grossly Disproportionate Due To His Advanced Age And Infirmities, And
Thus Is The Functional Equivalent Of A Life Sentence

Mr. Faucher was not sentenced to fixed life; however, the Idaho Supreme Court has
recently recognized that reviewing courts should not "focus[] too narrowly on how a sentence is
characterized." State v. Shanahan, No. 45716, 2019 WL 3022782, at *5 (Idaho July 11, 2019).
In Shanahan, the Court held that the juvenile defendant's fixed thirty-five year sentence was not
the functional equivalent of a determinate life sentence where the juvenile would be fifty years
old at the time of parole eligibility. Id. The Shanahan majority wrote, "To provide a hyperbolic
example, it could not reasonably be argued that a 100-year fixed sentence would provide a
meaningful opportunity for release, even though it is not technically a fixed life sentence. In
essence, we recognize that at some point on the sentencing spectrum, a lengthy fixed sentence
equates to a fixed life sentence." Shanahan at *5 (recognizing that "the rationales of Miller v.

Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) and Windom v. State, 162 Idaho 417 (2017) also extend to
lengthy fixed sentences that are the functional equivalent of a determinate life sentence,

10

regardless of whether such sentences are characterized as indeterminate life sentences or
otherwise.")
Although a defendant's age and physical condition are "not ordinarily relevant to the
determination of whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range," "age may
be a reason to impose a sentence below the applicable guideline range when the defendant is
elderly and infirm and where a form of punishment such as home confinement might be equally
efficient as and less costly than incarceration." U.S.S.G. § 5Hl.1-2. 4 See e.g., United States v.
Baron, 914 F. Supp. 660 (D. Mass. 1995) (held that downward departure from Sentencing
Guidelines was warranted due to defendant's advanced age and physical infirmities.)
The Baron Court reasoned, "I must make those quantitative judgments about both
factors-age and infirmity. Age and infirmity are linked by a conjunction in § 5Hl.1 (i.e., the
defendants must be both "elderly" and "infirm")." Baron at 662. The Baron Court engaged in a
downward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines because the defendant was seventy-sixyears old with a life expectancy of 7.39 years and had an unstable medical condition with several
conditions potentially exacerbating each other and, should the medical balance be upset by
simple issues such as stress and exposure to common germs, the result could be a rapid
deterioration to a life-threatening illness. Id. There are few cases involving defendants in this
age range, and the courts sentencing elderly defendants have found age to be a significant
consideration. See e.g. United States v. Moy, 1995 WL 311441 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
The Idaho Supreme Court has never addressed the question of whether a sentence that is
effectively a fixed life sentence for an elderly and/or infirm defendant is unconstitutional or

4

The United State Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G) are applicable to the sentencing procedures
for federal courts; however, Mr. Faucher urges the Idaho courts to adopt the reasoning utilized
by some federal courts, consistent with the U.S.S.G, in sentencing elderly and infirm defendants.
11

violates that defendant's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.

However, in

State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 146 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown,
121 Idaho 385 (1992); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982), the Idaho Supreme
Court has recognized a point first made by Justice Bistline in his dissent in State v. Adams, 99
Idaho 75, 79 (1978), that in modifying sentences, the Court "has given great weight to the age of
a defendant." Broadhead, at 144 (citations omitted).
Both elderly criminals and criminals who will become elderly during their sentence have
a remarkably low recidivism rate-99% are never convicted of another crime upon release.
Patricia S. Corwin, Senioritis: Why Elderly Federal Inmates Are Literally Dying to Get Out of

Prison, 17 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 687, 687-88 (2001) (citing U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Probation and Parole Violators in State Prison, Aug. 1995 (noting that the recidivism rate for
older parolees and probationers, the rate of reincarceration, is 1.4%, while 51.4% of parolees and
probationers returned to prison were between the ages of eighteen to twenty-nine); Mary Foster,

Prisons Costly Dilemma: Caring for Elderly Prisoners: Younger More Dangerous Men are
Released While Aging Inmates Sentenced to Life Without Parole Cost the System Millions, L.A.
Times, May 6, 1990 5 ( finding experts often agree that age is the most reliable indicator in
predicting recidivism; reports have showed recidivism rates of 22% for inmates aged eighteen to
twenty-four within a year of release as compared to rates of 2% for inmates over forty-five years
old).

5

https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-05-06-mn-308-story.html,
August 13, 2019.
12

lasted

visited

Mr. Faucher will be

in October of 2019. (PSI, p.2.) The average
6

life expectancy of someone his age is

However, Mr. Faucher has several serious

physical ailments that are not factored into the average life expectancy equation. Mr. Faucher's
physical health is not good-he suffers from hemochromatosis and is unable to walk due to
severe hip and knee problems, he has a B12 deficiency for which he takes medication, and has
brain disease. (PSI, p.20.) Additionally, Mr. Faucher takes an antidepressant drug, Cylexa, and
Ropinirole for his restless leg syndrome. (PSI, p.20.)

a.

Mr. Faucher's Twenty-Five Year Fixed Sentence Raises The Inference Of
Disproportionality

Here, Mr. Faucher pled guilty to two counts of dissemination of sexually exploitative
materials and two counts of possession of sexually exploitative materials. 7 (9/28/18 Tr., p.5,
L.10 - p.7, L.14; p.18, Ls.9-11; p.20, Ls.2-5; p.21, L.25 - p.22, L.3; R., pp.186-199.) All of the
conduct for which Mr. Faucher pled guilty occurred from January 17, 2018, to February 2, 2018.
(9/28/18 Tr., p.5, L.10 - p.7, L.14; p.18, Ls.9-11; p.20, Ls.2-5; p.21, L.25 -p.22, L.3; R., pp.6572.) While Mr. Faucher was charged with separate offenses arising from his conduct during this
time frame, it is without question that his conduct was part of one continuous discourse. (PSI,
pp.2-3; 6-7.) Mr. Faucher's crimes occurred at a unique time in his life when he was extremely
isolated and suffering from mental and physical illnesses. (PSI, pp.6-7, 217-18.) He was
experiencing a crisis of faith and of self, which was exacerbated by his diagnosed condition of
alcohol-induced dementia.

(PSI, pp.6-7, 172, 185, 195, 198-99, 217-18.)

6

While it is not

Social Security Online Life Expectancy Calculator, https://www.ssa.gov/cgi-bin/longevity.cgi,
last viewed August 5, 2019.
7
Mr. Faucher also pled guilty to felony possession of a controlled substance, which will not be
specifically discussed in this Appellant's Brief due to the more pressing need to address the
lengthy sentences of the other four criminal convictions.
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disputed that the devastation victims of child pornography suffer is serious, the sentences
imposed by the district court are disproportionate to Mr. Faucher’s crimes, particularly where
Mr. Faucher is

and is unable to walk.

At the time of sentencing, Mr. Faucher was

(PSI, p.2.) The

district court’s imposition of a fixed twenty-five year sentence renders Mr. Faucher ineligible for
parole unless he survives in prison and reaches the

Under these

circumstances, the fixed sentences imposed by the district court are disproportionate to
Mr. Faucher’s crimes where there was no physical contact between Mr. Faucher and his victims,
as compared to other, lesser Idaho sentences for crimes of a sexual nature.
Idaho appellate courts have reviewed sentences that are alleged to constitute cruel and
unusual punishment. In State v. Coffelt, 127 Idaho 439, 443 (Ct. App. 1995), the Idaho Court of
Appeals concluded that a unified life sentence, with twenty-years fixed, was not out of all
proportion to the gravity of the offense committed, nor was the sentence so severe as to shock the
conscience of reasonable people where the defendant held his

daughter down and

taped her mouth closed so no one could hear her screaming as he raped her on several occasions.
Id. 127 Idaho at 442-43. The defendant had two prior convictions for sexual offenses and
admitted to molesting a total of between forty and forty-five victims. Id. 127 Idaho at 442.
In State v. Reese, 98 Idaho 347 (1977), the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the imposition of
a fifteen year sentence for one count of lewd and lascivious conduct, where the defendant had a
history of criminal and antisocial behavior ranging from assault to sodomy to grand larceny. 98
Idaho at 348. The trial judge found that the defendant was “potentially dangerous, particularly to
young people.” Id.

14

In State v. Shanahan, 133 Idaho 896, 900 (Ct. App. 1999), the Idaho Court of Appeals
held that the defendant's concurrent unified life sentences, with 35 yeas fixed for murder and 10
years fixed for robbery, did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment given the "premeditated
and cold-blooded nature of the crime" for which the defendant pied guilty in exchange for the
State agreeing not to seek the death penalty.

Id. 133 Idaho at 900.

The Court found a

proportionality review unnecessary, as there was no inference of a gross proportionality. Id.
In light of Mr. Faucher's age and physical infirmities, the district court's imposition of a
twenty-five year fixed sentence is tantamount to life sentence. A comparison of the sentences in
Mr. Faucher's case with the sentences in Coffelt and Reese, which involved physical contact
between the victim and the defendant, clearly distinguishes the sentences in Mr. Faucher's case
and raises the inference that Mr. Faucher's sentences are disproportionate to his crimes. Because
the inference of disproportionality arises here, the Court must consider sentences imposed in
similar cases.

2.

Similar Cases Demonstrate The Disproportionality Of Mr. Faucher's Sentences

There are only a handful of cases in Idaho where the conviction was for conduct
somewhat similar to that in Mr. Faucher's case. In State v. Gillespie, Mr. Gillespie initially pied
guilty to one count of possessing sexually exploitative material for other than a commercial
purpose, and the district court, pursuant to a plea agreement, withheld judgment and imposed
five years of probation. State v. Gillespie, 155 Idaho 714, 716 (Ct. App. 2013). Upon a finding
of guilt after a third probation violation, including two additional convictions for possession of
sexually exploitative materials, Mr. Gillespie was sentenced to ten years, with two years
determinate, on the original charge, and two ten-year sentences, with three years determinate, on
each of the two new charges, to run consecutively to the first conviction, for an aggregate unified
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sentence of twenty years, with five fixed. Id. 155 Idaho at 722. The Idaho Court of Appeals
held:
[T]he record shows that in Docket No. 39426, Gillespie received lenity, being
granted a withheld judgment and probation on his first conviction for possession
of sexually exploitative material for other than a commercial purpose. He then
repeatedly and persistently violated terms of probation, mostly for sexual
misconduct and accessing the Internet without permission. His probation officer
did not seek revocation of probation until the third set of violations. A search at
this time found Gillespie again in possession of images of minors engaged in
sexual conduct, which gave rise to his second conviction. A polygraph conducted
as part of a psychosexual evaluation for sentencing purposes indicated that
Gillespie was not truthful in denying that he had committed other sex crimes. The
psychosexual evaluator concluded that Gillespie was not amenable to communitybased treatment and recommended that he be placed in a secure facility for sex
offender treatment. On this record, and considering particularly Gillespie's poor
performance while on probation for his first sexual exploitation offense, we
cannot say that his sentences are excessive.

Id. 155 Idaho at 722-23. Similarly, in in State v. Claiborne, 120 Idaho 581, 582 (1991), the
defendant was sentenced to five years, with one years fixed, with the court retaining jurisdiction,
after pleading guilty to one count of possession of sexually exploitative materials in violation of
I.C. § 18-1507A. 8
As for crimes involving the physical presence of a victim and that victim's abuse by the
defendant's own hands, in Coffelt, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed a unified life sentence,
with twenty-years fixed, where the defendant held his

daughter down and taped her

mouth closed so no one could hear her screaming as he raped her on several occasions. 127
Idaho at 442-43. The defendant had two prior convictions for sexual offenses and admitted to
molesting a total of between forty and forty-five victims. Id. 127 Idaho at 442.
In State v. Dutt, 139 Idaho 99, 101 (Ct. App. 2003), the defendant was convicted of three
counts of lewd conduct with a minor, LC. § 18-1508, after his

8

stepdaughter

Idaho Code § 18-1507A was repealed effective July 1, 2012, and the substance of its content
was incorporated into LC. § 18-1507.
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revealed that he had sexually abused her over a three-year period. Id. He was sentenced to two
concurrent unified terms of thirty years, with minimum periods of confinement of ten years, and
to a concurrent unified term of twenty years, with a ten-year minimum period of confinement.
Id. See also State v. Frauenberger, 154 Idaho 294, 296-97 (Ct. App. 2013) (The district court

imposed concurrent unified ten-year sentences, with two years fixed, for lewd conduct with a
minor under sixteen, and a concurrent unified four-year sentence, with one year fixed, for
distribution of marijuana).
Because there are few appellate cases wherein the defendant was convicted of
distribution of sexually explicit materials in Idaho, Mr. Faucher will examine the sentences of

several cases outside the jurisdiction in order to evince his sentence as grossly disproportionate. 9
In United States v. Schales, the defendant was convicted of one count of receiving or
distributing material involving the sexual exploitation of minors, one count of possessing
material involving the sexual exploitation of minors, and one count of receiving or producing a
visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct that is obscene. 546 F.3d 965,
970 (9th Cir. 2008). He was sentenced to a term of incarceration of 210 months (17.5 years) on
Counts One and Three, and 120 months on Count Two, to run concurrently. Id.

9

In Idaho, distribution of exploitative materials carries a maximum sentence of thirty years.
LC.§ 18-1507. Comparison with sentences from other state courts is difficult, as sentences for
distribution of such materials ranges from a maximum sentence of five years (California (Cal.
Penal Code§§ 311.1-3); Iowa (Iowa Code Ann.§ 728.12); Kansas (Kan. Stat. Ann.§ 21-5510);
Kentucky (Ken. Rev. Stat. Ann § 531.320) to 100 years (Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-625)). See
Report to Congress:
Federal Child Pornography Offenses
Appendix F,
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/sexo ffense-topics/201212- federal-child-pornography-offens es/Appendix F. pdf,
last
viewed
August 5, 2019. Comparison to federal violations is not particularly helpful due to the strict
parameters of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 5Hl.1.
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In People v. Batchelor, 800 P.2d 599, 600-01 (Colo. 1990), the defendant was charged
and convicted of one count of sexual exploitation of a child for taking close-up photographs of
child's genitals and anus. Id. 800 P.2d at 604. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction pursuant to which the defendant was sentenced to up to 60 days incarceration in
county jail, together with four years probation and a $5,000 fine. Id. 800 P.2d at 600-01.
In United States v. Rausch, 570 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (D. Colo. 2008), the
defendant was convicted of possessing thousands of images of "hard core child pornography."
Rausch, 570 F. Supp. at 1299. Although the Court calculated the sentence under the Guidelines

to be 97 to 120 months, it sentenced the defendant to one day of incarceration with supervised
release due to his age and infirmities, including three kidney dialysis treatments three times per
week. Rausch, 570 F. Supp. at 1308. The Court considered the defendant's extremely poor
heath and his complex needs for medical care, his previous prison employment and vulnerability
to victimization, his prior history of successful home confmement, and that "there is no
discernible risk that Rausch has or will engage in sexual predatory behavior, and the public can
be protected by his home confinement." Id.
The defendant's probable term of confmement of one day in Raush, sixty days
incarceration in Batchelor, and the defendant's seventeen and one-half year fixed term in
Schales, are substantially less than the fixed twenty-five year sentence imposed upon

Mr. Faucher. A review of cases in other jurisdictions involving similar offenses overwhelmingly
supports the conclusion that Mr. Faucher's sentence is grossly disproportionate to his offenses.
The sentence imposed upon Mr. Faucher by the district court, when compared with
sentences imposed for similar offenses both in Idaho and other jurisdictions, clearly
demonstrates Mr. Faucher's sentences are disproportionate to his offenses and violate the
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constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Not only are Mr. Faucher's
sentences disproportionate to his conduct, but a fixed twenty-five year sentence imposed upon an
infirm man Mr. Faucher's age is tantamount to a life sentence and is shocking to the consciences
of reasonable people. Accordingly, Mr. Faucher urges this Court to vacate his sentences and
remand his case for resentencing, or alternatively, reduce or suspend his sentences as this Court
deems appropriate.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Sentence Of Twenty-Five Years
Fixed, Upon Mr. Faucher Following His Plea Of Guilty To Two Counts Of Possessing Sexually
Exploitative Materials, Two Counts Of Distributing Sexually Exploitative Materials, And One
Count Of Felony Possession Of A Controlled Substance
Mr. Faucher asserts that, given any view of the facts, his aggregate sentence of twentyfive years, fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an
excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection
of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). In reviewing a trial
court's decision for an abuse of discretion, the relevant inquiry regards four factors:
Whether the trial court: ( 1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached
its decision by the exercise of reason.

Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).
Mr. Faucher does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.
Accordingly, in order to show the district court abused its discretion by failing to reach its
decision by the exercise of reason, Mr. Faucher must show that in light of the governing criteria,
the sentences were excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or
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objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual
and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution
for wrongdoing.

Id.

In light of the mitigating factors present in this case, Mr. Faucher's

sentence is excessive considering any view of the facts.
Although Idaho appellate courts have never before addressed whether advanced age and
physical infirmity warrant a reduced sentence, the federal courts have so concluded.

For

example, in United States v. Baron, 914 F. Supp. 660 (D. Mass. 1995), the court noted that while
a defendant's age and physical condition were "not ordinarily relevant to the determination of
whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range," under U.S.S.G § SHI .2, 10
Introductory Commentary, "age may be a reason to impose a sentence below the applicable
guideline range when the defendant is elderly and infirm and where a form of punishment such
as home confinement might be equally efficient as and less costly than incarceration." U.S.S.G §
SHI. I.
The court reasoned:
At the same time as the guidelines discourage age and infirmity departure, the
language of this section invites the district court to give the matter serious
consideration. See United States v. Rivera, 994 F. 2d 942 (1st Cir. 1993). Unlike
other areas of the guidelines, where the fact that the Sentencing Commission
considered a given factor to a degree undermines its use as a basis for departure,
here I am invited to make certain quantitative judgments-the degree of infirmity
of the defendant, the degree to which home confinement is efficient and costly as
compared with imprisonment. Rivera, supra at 947-51.
Baron, 416 F. Supp. at 662 (holding downward sentencing departure warranted for

10

The Federal Sentencing Guidelines discourage (but do not prohibit) a downward departure
based solely on age. "[A]ge (including youth) is not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a
departure is warranted," though exceptions may exist for "elderly and infirm" defendants for
whom other forms of punishment would be "equally efficient and less costly." U.S.S.G. §
SHI. I.
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defendant, whose pituitary had been removed due to cancer, and who had cardiac
condition and was suspected of having prostate cancer); see United States v. Lee, 454 F.3d 836,
839 (8th Cir. 2006) ("age is normally not relevant to sentencing, unless the defendant is elderly
and infirm").
Further, the Baron Court reasoned that keeping infirm elderly persons behind bars can be
far costlier than imprisoning younger persons, and noted:
As a general matter, as well as being costly, imprisonment is not efficacious
particularly where the offender is not as likely to commit future crimes as a
younger offender. Indeed, the Commission permits home confinement as an
alternative form of punishment when home confinement of an elderly and infirm
defendant is "equally efficient as and less costly than incarceration." § 5H 1.1.
Baron, at 664. The Baron Court based its decision on an analysis of sentencing decisions from

other jurisdictions, noting that these decisions represented substantial departures, as much as 4060% reductions:
I also have set my decision to depart downward in the context of a number of
decisions in which defendants, less aged and to a degree, less infirm, than
Mr. Baron were given substantial departures. In United States v. Maltese, 1993
WL 222350, *9 (N.D.Ill.1993) the court granted a
defendant, who
had been suffering from liver cancer for a year prior to the sentencing, a
downward departure for his sentence accompanying an illegal gambling
conviction. The court found that the defendant's life expectancy had been
shortened due to an operation for the cancer, and that the defendant's required
medical treatment, chemotherapy, would be extremely expensive for - the state to
provide. Hence, the court held that Mr. Maltese was sufficiently "elderly and
infirm," and that an alternative form of confinement would be "equally efficient
as and less costly than incarceration," as required under § 5Hl.1 of the
Guidelines. In addition, the court found that Mr. Maltese's infirmity arose from an
"extraordinary physical impairment," as mandated by§ 5Hl.4 of the Guidelines.
Similarly, in U.S. v. Moy, [1995 WL 311441] the court granted a downward
departure to an elderly defendant (age 78) who suffered from coronary artery
disease, a recent hernia repair, and a history of depression. The combination of
Mr. Moy's age and medical history, his substantial family responsibilities (he
provided daily care to his partially incapacitated wife), and his prior "hardworking
lawful life as a businessman and civic leader of excellent repute," influenced the
court to lower his sentence from the prescribed 78-97 month sentence for an
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illegal gambling conviction. The court ultimately reduced the defendant's
minimum sentence by 61 %, allowing a 48-month departure to a 30-month
sentence. See also United States v. Libutti, 1994 WL 774647 (D.N.J.1994)
(departure for
defendant, suffering from coronary problems, a
personality disorder and several psychiatric conditions and phobias); United
States v. Dusenbery, 9 F.3d 110, Unpublished Disposition (6th Cir.1993)
(departure due to age and medical condition, the removal of both kidneys, and the
necessity to undergo dialysis three times a week).

Baron, 914 F. Supp. at 664-65 (internal citations and footnotes omitted).
Similarly, in United States v. Rausch, 570 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (D. Colo. 2008), the Court
calculated the Guidelines sentence to be 97 to 120 months, but sentenced the
defendant to one day of incarceration with supervised release after he was convicted of
possessing several thousand images of "hard core child pornography", due to his age and
infirmities including three kidney dialysis treatment three times per week. In United States v.

Willis, 322 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D. Mass. 2004), the court explained its downward departure to two
years of probation for an elderly defendant convicted of tax evasion where defendant was
and suffering from several medical condition including early stage leukemia.
Mr. Faucher asserts that the district court failed to properly consider the mitigating
factors, including his age and physical and mental infirmities, that exist in his case. Mr. Faucher
was

when he appeared before the district court for sentencing. (PSI, p.2.) Idaho

courts have previously recognized that in modifying sentences, the Court "has given great weight
to the age of a defendant." State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 144 (1991), overruled on other

grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385 (1992). Mr. Faucher's advanced age and total lack of
a criminal record for over seventy years support his request for probation. The district court
failed to properly consider that at the

, the twenty-five-year fixed sentence it

imposed would likely be a life sentence for Mr. Faucher's first offense. Although supervision
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may be appropriate for the remainder of his life, certainly a

first time

felon, is not deserving of what will be a death sentence.
Mr. Faucher's advanced age is not the only reason that his twenty-five-year fixed
sentence will likely result in a probable death sentence for his first crime. Mr. Faucher suffers
from a variety of health problems.

The Idaho Court of Appeals has recognized that

"rehabilitation and health problems are factors to consider in a motion for reduction in a
sentence." State v. James, 112 Idaho 239, 243-44 (Ct. App. 1986). Mr. Faucher has been
confined to a wheelchair for the last year or two due to knee and hip conditions which continue
to deteriorate. (PSI, pp.175, 183.) He takes medication for restless leg syndrome, and began
suffering from left-sided headaches that began in approximately 2017, and which have been
worsening over time. (PSI, pp.174, 189.) He suffers from hemochromatosis, a condition in
which the body absorbs too much iron from food, and which affects a person's organs and can
lead to life-threatening conditions. 11 (PSI, p.175.)
Although Mr. Faucher drank alcohol in social settings for many years, his drinking
pattern accelerated significantly over the last several years. (PSI, pp.22, 176.) Approximately
fourteen years ago, he began regularly drinking two drinks of scotch every evening, but after his
retirement, he began drinking heavily-at least half a liter of scotch daily. 12 (PSI, pp.22, 17678.) He drank heavily throughout 2017. (PSI, p.189.) It was also at this time that he became
apathetic-he stopped brushing his teeth or opening his mail. (PSI, p.31; 12/20/18 Tr., p.63, L.6
- p.64, L.10.) For an eighteen-month period of time, Mr. Faucher was drinking heavily and was
depressed and despondent due to isolation-his lack of ties with the church, from which he had

11

"Hemochromatosis is an iron disorder in which the body simply loads too much iron. This
action is genetic and the excess iron, if left untreated, can damage joints, organs, and eventually
be fatal." https://www.hemochromatosis.org/#overview, last viewed August 6, 2019.
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retired, and his family, whom were largely unresponsive to his efforts to engage. (PSI, pp.26-28,
32, 177-78, 199.) He would often sit at his desk and cry. (PSI, p.28.) Mr. Faucher sought help
for depression from his bishop, but he was told the bishop "does not have time for [y]ou." (PSI,
p.29.) Mr. Faucher was experiencing a deterioration of his physical health due to his depression,
which caused him to drink heavily and eat poorly. (PSI, p.177.) He became reliant on the
connections he made with strangers while on the internet, believing both the church and his
family had rejected him. (PSI, pp.29, 178.)
When the district court began to explain its reasoning prior to pronouncing the sentence,
the court said, "But I fail to understand how drinking excessively, social isolation, or being in
some sort of - being at odds with your church ... leads to interest in child pornography. There's
no link that's been demonstrated." (12/20/18 Tr., p.146, Ls.7-14.) However, the district court
apparently misconstrued Dr. Craig Beaver's reports, which were included in the PSI materials.

(See PSI, pp.172-218.) In his September 14, 2018 Neurological Report, Dr. Beaver concluded
that Mr. Faucher was experiencing alcohol-induced dementia during this time period.
pp.196-200.)

(PSI,

Dr. Beaver's conclusions were based on the MRI and supported by the

neurological examination by Dr. Williams, who also concluded that Mr. Faucher had alcohol
induced dementia. (PSI, pp.189, 193, 198-99.) The district court apparently failed to consider
these scientific findings and evidence, and thus abused its discretion by failing to act consistently
with the applicable legal standards where the Idaho Supreme Court has held that the trial court
must consider a defendant's mental illness as a factor at sentencing. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho
573, 581 (1999).

12

Mr. Faucher would spend hours on the internet when intoxicated. (PSI, p.215.)
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Dr. Beaver concluded, based on a brain MRI and neuropsychometric testing, that
Mr.Faucher suffers from alcohol-induced dementia/delirium. (PSI, pp.172-185, 195, 198-99.)
When administered neuropsychological testing, Mr. Faucher demonstrated difficulties with
executive functioning.

(PSI, p.180.)

Specifically, he struggled with rapid decision-making,

demonstrated significant difficulties with the ability to sustain his focus and to have good
impulse control. 13

(PSI, pp.179-80.)

Based on his personality traits, the neuropsychologist

concluded that Mr. Faucher "may be prone to addictive behaviors or irresponsible acting out
during periods of duress." (PSI, p.181.) Mr. Faucher has "significant neurocognitive deficits,
particularly in the area of sustained attention and concentration," and "particular difficulty with
inhibitory control." (PSI, p.182.) Dr. Craig Beaver concluded that the neurocognitive deficits
were the result of three factors:
(1) Mr. Faucher's residual neurocognitive difficulties from excessive alcohol use
with poor nutrition for a period of time;
(2) Major depression; and
(3) The possibility of a frontal temporal-type dementia is also a consideration.
(PSI, p.182.)

Dr. Beaver concluded, "there are strong indications that [Mr. Faucher's]

medical/mental health status played a substantial role in the alleged behaviors." (PSI, p.184.)
"Given his age, and potentially his history of hemochromatosis, it is likely he was not only
drinking excessively during this period of time but his body was less able to metabolize that
amount of alcohol. This would fit with an onset of alcohol related dementia that has gradually
improved now that he has discontinued alcohol use and is eating more regularly." (PSI, p.195.)
Dr. Beaver's diagnosis was confirmed by another neurologist, Dr. Whiteside, who noted "his
presenting complaints, brain MRI showing moderate atrophy, and B 12 deficiency was consistent

13

The testing was adjusted to account for Mr. Faucher's age. (PSI, p.179.)
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with an individual with alcohol-related dementia."

(PSI, p.198.)

After meeting with

Mr. Faucher additional times and evaluating the results of the brain MRI, 14 Dr. Beaver
concluded:
[I]t is probable that he was experiencing a mild substance intoxication delirium
before his arrest and was suffering from a significant disturbance in his ability to
sustain attention and have good awareness in his environment, as well as having a
significant disturbance in his cognition, particularly in the area of judgment.

Thomas Faucher's depression, significant alcohol use and impaired cognition
secondary to his alcohol abuse and poor nutrition, were contributing factors in the
events that took place. They significantly impaired his reasoning, judgment, and
inhibitory control. They also resulted in an impairment in which he was more
easily manipulated by others.
(PSI, p.200.) In fact, Mr. Faucher's life had become so isolated and lonely that he commented to
Dr. Johnston, "jail has been good for me." (PSI, p.255.) As Dr. Beaver noted:
Mr. Faucher described himself us a well-adjusted person for most of his life.
However, he noted that he began to experience significant psychological
problems after his forced retirement when he became severely depressed, avoided
social contact, did not care about his hygienic needs or physical appearance and
consumed abundant amounts of alcohol. He also began to experience persistent
headaches. As his physical and mental health continued to deteriorate, he became
consumed with the Internet.
(PSI, pp.217-18.)

In all, the Skype conversations document that Mr. Faucher sent at least $5,000 to Bruno
and other young people with whom he was trying to establish an online friendship. 15 (PSI, pp.6,
30-31, 462-63, 683-693, 700-02, 745-46, 917-920, 932, 940-42, 944, 953, 1081, 1119, 1134,
1147-48, 1218, 1249, 1312, 1315, 1321.) Upon realizing that his (only) friend, Bruno, was
interested in child pornography, Mr. Faucher told Bruno that his goal was to keep Bruno happy.

14

Dr. Beaver met with Mr. Faucher five times over a six-month period of time. (PSI, p.196.)
During this time Mr. Faucher fell victim to an online scam while trying to purchase
methamphetamine. (See PSI, pp.795-821.)
15
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(PSI, pp.9, 33, 1134.) He said he started liking watching the images and videos because it
pleased Bruno. (PSI, pp.1157-58, 1032-33.) Nevertheless, Mr. Faucher tried several times to
delete all of the files pertaining to children that Bruno, and another individual Bruno had
connected him with, had sent to Mr. Faucher. (PSI, pp.33, 1107, 1257, 1772-78.) Twice
Mr. Faucher told Bruno he was not going to communicate with him any longer, that he had
reaffirmed his devotion to the church. (PSI, p.5.) Each time, loneliness drove Mr. Faucher back
to his daily online interactions with Bruno. (PSI, pp.6-7, 36, 454-55; 12/20/18 Tr., p.46, L.23 –
p.48, L.15.)
At sentencing, the prosecutor located all of the salacious parts of Mr. Faucher’s online
conversations, but did not discuss the thousands of pages of innocuous conversation between
Mr. Faucher and his friend Bruno regarding Brazilian history, Bruno’s living circumstances
(with his parents), his interests in Satanism and the modifications he made to his appearance
(having the whites of his eyes tattooed black). (PSI, pp.6, 891, 1018-24.) Mr. Faucher told
Bruno of his health problems and shared his enthusiasm to have his bathroom remodeled to
include a walk-in bathtub. (PSI, pp.980, 996-97, 1090.) Mr. Faucher had suffered a bad fall and
had limited physical mobility such that he used a walker and could not go out to get his own
mail. (PSI, pp.837, 924, 965, 997, 1027-28, 1030-31.) He also told Bruno of his vision
problems—macular degeneration and cataracts. (PSI, pp. 931, 997.) And that he was depressed
and drinking, heavily. (PSI, pp.925, 934, 945, 965, 991-92, 1103, 1112, 1119, 1194, 1209, 1226,
1346.) And that he was not eating much during this time period. (PSI, p.1842.)
Mr. Faucher asserts that the district court failed to give proper consideration to his status
as a first time offender. The Idaho Supreme Court has “recognized that the first offender should
be accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal.” State v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670,
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673 (1998) (quoting State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953), overruled on other grounds by
State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227 (1971)); see also State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982). The
charges in this case resulted in Mr. Faucher’s first convictions for a criminal act. (PSI, p.10.)
Mr. Faucher has never been previously convicted or charged with a misdemeanor or a felony.
(PSI, p.10.) His prior record does not even reveal a single traffic citation. (PSI, p.10.) As such,
Mr. Faucher presents to the Court as an individual who was able to fully obey all laws for over
seventy years. (PSI, pp.2, 10.)
Mr. Faucher does have support within his family and the community to assist him in his
rehabilitation.

Mr. Faucher received an outpouring of letters from friends and community

members who had been positively affected by Mr. Faucher—over seventy-five letters of support
were submitted to the court. (PSI, pp.56-146.) Mr. Faucher clearly has the support of his friends
and his community. These letters show Mr. Faucher to be a caring man of the cloth, beloved in
his community, and an inspirational mentor to generations of individuals.
Richard Groves, a pastor who has known Mr. Faucher for over thirty years, told the court,
“I hope that his entire life’s work is taken into consideration when sentencing is imposed.” (PSI,
p.89.)
Another long-time friend and parishioner, Michael Ellsworth, asked the court to consider
a lenient sentence, taking into account “the lifelong contributions to society by this man,
demonstrated positive works of this priest, defender of justice, leader of people, creative genius,
inspirer of poor in spirit.” (PSI, p.75.)
James Sheehan, a former pastor, wrote to express his gratitude to Mr. Faucher for saving
his life by intervening to get him assistance when he was near death as a result of end stage
alcoholism.

(PSI, p.135.)
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Ms. Debbie Snodgrass wrote:
Mr. Tom’s sermons were inspirational. He knew how to see through the hardness
of some hearts, making them all better. Mr. Tom spent his life making others feel
more important never taking credit for all the good works he did. He changed a
lot of people for the better.
(PSI, p.137.)
Colonel Christopher Rood, wrote to the court regarding Mr. Faucher:
He is a frail
man and in poor medical condition. I respectfully request
the Court consider imposing a lenient sentence considering his life’s long list of
wonderful service to us all.
(PSI, p.131.)
The district court erred by sentencing Mr. Faucher more harshly because of his
profession—using his status as a clergy member, a self-sacrificing and esteemed profession, as
an aggravating circumstance:
Now, the fact that the defendant is a priest I think can be viewed as an
aggravating factor as well.
I’m certainly not going to try to, through this sentence, adjudicate the Catholic
Church child sexual abuse scandals, to try to send any message that regards that
entire scandal. This case is not about that issue in any way. It’s just about this
defendant. The fact that he is a priest and is supposed to be, as a result of that,
some sort of a beacon of moral goodness, somebody who holds himself out as, on
some level, an example and some level of an advisor on how to try to live a good
and wholesome life and be a decent person and make the most of your time here
on earth, that someone who has had that well-respected job, that that was his life
and that he, nevertheless, did these things, is certainly a disturbing and
aggravating factor.
(12/20/18 Tr., p.139, L.16 - p.140, L.7.) The district court again abused its discretion for failing
to act consistently with the legal standards applicable to the court’s specific choices. Here, the
district court did not recognize what information constitutes an aggravating factor.

The

defendant’s (former) employment as a clergyman does not establish an aggravator, particularly
where there was no indication that Mr. Faucher was abusing the public trust associated with the
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profession when he committed these internet-based offenses at his home. Further, the district
court appeared personally disappointed and disgusted with Mr. Faucher. (12/20/18 Tr., p.139,
L.16 - p.140, L.7.) For example, the district court said that a priest is a “beacon of moral
goodness” which is not an unbiased statement and clearly places upon Mr. Faucher a burden far
beyond that of an ordinary profession, an additional burden to demonstrate impeccable morality.
Further, Mr. Faucher was no longer an actively practicing priest. He had retired in 2015—three
years before his internet activity resulted in these charges. (PSI, p.26.) The district court
considered Mr. Faucher’s crime more terrible than it would have otherwise because of his
profession.

“[T]he court’s own sense of religious propriety had somehow been betrayed.”

United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 741 (4th Cir. 1991). “As was done in Bakker, at the very
least the sentence should be vacated and the cause remanded to the district court for resentencing
by another district judge.” See Broadhead, 120 Idaho at 156 (J. Bistline, dissenting).
The district court abused its discretion by failing to reach its decision not to suspend
Mr. Faucher’s sentence through an exercise of reason. In sentencing Mr. Faucher, the district
court stated the reasons it was not placing Mr. Faucher on probation pursuant to the
considerations of I.C. § 19-2521:
So from a protection-of-the-community standpoint, in terms of avoiding the risk
the defendant engages in further activity that perpetuates the child pornography
industry, I think there is a legitimate reason for incarceration. There is some level
of concern in the materials, I think, that he might act on some of these kinds of
impulses that he expressed. Dr. Johnston viewed there to be some reason for
concern about that, and it’s not hard to understand why, given the very disturbing
things about which the defendant fantasized.
Now, as I’ve mentioned, the defendant’s age and health status presents some
practical impediments to him acting on some of those impulses, at least if he’s
doing it alone, but as I also mentioned, he has engaged in discussions with some
of these folks he was on the Internet about, about -- that were going down the
road to whether they should make something like this happen, and so it's not
beyond the pale, the idea that the defendant and somebody else who is more able-
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bodied could collaborate in something along these lines, and so I think there is a
legitimate risk to the community that he presents, and that there is a reason for
incarceration as a result of that.
(12/20/18 Tr., p.148, L.16 – p.149, L.14.) It is patently unreasonable to conclude that someone
Mr. Faucher talked to in a chat room, a person who lives in Brazil and has never visited
Mr. Faucher, would travel to Idaho and transport the elderly Mr. Faucher in his wheelchair to a
location where the things they discussed online would take place. Included in the non-salacious
parts of his conversations with Bruno was Mr. Faucher’s explanation of his physical limitations.
See e.g., Rausch, infra (holding “there is no discernible risk that Rausch has or will engage in
sexual predatory behavior, and the public can be protected by his home confinement.”)
Mr. Faucher had difficulty going to retrieve his mail from the mailbox, and he was having a
walk-in bathtub installed.

(PSI, pp.837, 924, 980, 997, 1014, 1027, 1030, 1090, 1205.)

Mr. Faucher was not a risk to the community and the district court abused its discretion in so
finding.
However, Mr. Faucher was not leading a secret double life for seventy-two years. He had
not sought out pornography depicting children for the first seventy-one years of his life. It was
only after his old life as a priest ended that he became deeply depressed and sought to repudiate
his former life and employer. In his process of refuting the church, he voiced an interest in
blasphemy, Satanism, and forbidden sexual thought and images.

He viewed some adult

pornography and then viewed and received disturbing, sexually exploitative images of children
upon his computer. (PSI, p.425.) Mr. Faucher even discussed the substance of several of these
images with the sender, his online friend, Bruno. (PSI, p.4.) Finally, late one evening he
engaged in a conversation with a new person and sent two of the images by email. (PSI, pp.341-
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42.) However, Mr. Faucher's six-month period of shocking behavior, while repugnant, does not
erase his seventy-plus years of service and decency.
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Faucher asserts that the district court
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him. He asserts that had the
district court properly considered his deteriorating mental health conditions at the time of the
incidents and his family and community support it would have imposed a less severe sentence.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Faucher respectfully requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing in front of a different district court judge. Alternatively, he requests that this
Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 21 st day of August, 2019.
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